The Inferential Model of Meaning: An Abandoned Route

Abstract

A speaker utters the grammatically correct phrase ‘x y’, and the hearer understands its meaning. The Naiyāyika claims that the only epistemic instrument (pramāṇa) that generates the semantic connection (anvaya) between the meaning of x (henceforth |x|) and the meaning of y (henceforth |y|) is testimony (śabda). This connection is essentially the phrase-meaning. The Vaiśeṣika wants inference (anumāna) to generate this connection. After presenting the Vaiśeṣika view on this topic, this paper will argue that, the hearer considers the generic categories of |x| and |y|, and infers their ontic relation which finally will figure in the testimonial cognition. For example, when John tells Smith that ‘Jones smokes’, Smith first cognizes the meanings of the words, i.e., the individual called Jones and the activity of smoking. Then Smith infers that ‘John intends to say that the activity of smoking inheres in Jones, since an activity inheres in an individual.’ Thus, inherence which appears as the sematic connection is inferred in this case. If John is a reliable speaker (āpta), Smith will have a piece of testimonial knowledge. This is how the Vaiśeṣika’s inference could possibly support linguistic creativity. © 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.