Chapter 7

Discussion and Conclusion

The purpose of the study is to analyse the social psychological process of national identity construction among the exiled Tibetan refugees using a social identity approach and then relating it to understand how such identities are practised in everyday lives to attain social and political goals. At its core, the study revolves around three fundamental concepts: nation, national identity, and mobilisation. Further, it used these concepts to address the three-folded objectives that include examining the national features present in the Tibetan refugees' imagining of their nation and its social-psychological impacts, the realities of their refugee identity that contrast with their national pride, and how the feeling of both belonging to Tibet and not-belonging to exile state transforms into their lived behaviours.

Since abundant literature is available on the concept of nation, nationalism and national identity, the present work started highlighting the ambiguities present in these concepts that leave room for more interpretations. The present work is a focused approach to understanding the social-psychological dimensions of a nation, its trajectories and how it shapes an individual's mental scheme thus, it discusses the concept of nation and nationalism by considering those literatures that treated these concepts as a cultural artefact. Furthermore, by taking the case of 'nations without states' the study examines how existing literature has investigated the process of national identity construction in the condition of statelessness. The main purpose here is to highlight that the nation exists in people's minds, and it travels with them in the case of forced migration. It can also take rebirth in diasporic conditions. However, the study also discussed the

role of social identity in creating a perennial sense of belonging to a nation that is both national and transgenerational. Similarly, the role of social identity becomes more prominent in cases of refugee communities that profoundly rely on their national identity for survival in exile by maintaining group cohesion and collectivity. The following discussion led to the introduction of the case of Tibetan refugees who have survived the adversities of a stateless situation for the past six decades. The thesis, by making the Tibetan refugees its case study, further examines the aspects of the mobilisation process among a community that has shaped their way of life in dedication to freeing a nation that most of them had never visited. Such an approach addresses a potent research gap in which the mobilisation process has mainly been understood as an eventual phenomenon of collective participation, mostly in events of political and social protests. The study proposes that the process of mobilisation has far, in-depth psychological implications that can be reflected in the everyday affairs of an individual who belongs to a diasporic community. Thus, by analysing the recorded narratives of exiled Tibetan refugees in India, the study argues that these people share the rationality behind their decisions regarding everyday affairs, ranging from customary practices to professional choices. Rational justifications observed in the voices of these refugees are intrinsically rooted in their nationalist sentiments and political determination for the future of their community and nation. Evaluating such collective attitudes, the thesis finally proposes the concept of 'everyday mobilisation' that defines an aspect of the mobilisation process responsible for a community's struggle for recognition and reclaiming what they suppose is rightfully theirs, Tibet. The following parts of the discussion section provide an elaborative account of the findings, a comparison of the findings with the existing literature, the implications of the findings for future research, and the strengths and limitations of the present research thesis.

From the accumulated accounts of participants' thought processes, the present thesis illustrates the micro details embedded in the Tibetan refugee's sense of national identity and their experiences carrying it in all dimensions of personal, social and political lives. Further, using the relevant aspects of social identity as a theoretical lens, the study outlines the attributes that remain most valued to our participants in defining the intrinsic feature of their distinctiveness and how strong identification with such distinctiveness helps them perceive their group status as legitimate. Such identification, in turn, pilots the participants' understanding concerning the most ethnic way (which also holds strategic instrumentality in the given circumstances) to assume their social role in responding to a substantial external threat. However, the study is not limited to such binaries, but the significant feature of these data lies in addressing important mediating factors- such as leadership influences, relating to pains of group members, deprivations following refugee status, and faith in present political strategies - in negotiating between self-perception and social role in terms of adhering to everyday mobilisation for protection and continuation of their national status. Thus, the study contributes to our understanding of two interrelated concepts: first, how the continuity/longevity of the Tibetan social movement depends on the life choices of its participants and second, what identification factors make these individuals agree to such an orientation in the first place.

In most cases, participants evaluated the legitimacy of their distinct social identity by identifying with the attributes of their cultural and religious virtues and then comparing this distinctiveness against China's ethnic characteristics. Many accounts show that while appealing for independent status, they stressed the irrationality of China's vision by contrasting the differences in ethnicities, thus justifying why China and Tibet cannot be one. Further, the seriousness of such categorisation reflected in their insecurities related to, first, the fear of losing cultural and

religious ties in an exiled land and, second, the firm belief that China's motive is not to rule or develop Tibet for their own benefits but to destroy or eradicate every indigenous value that makes Tibet including geographical richness and customary practices. Looking through Tajfel's concept of social creativity (Tajfel, 1978), these accounts help us understand how participants use the concept of Tibetan purity to emphasise its worth in saving from the ill intentions of outside enemies. Similarly, conceptualising our analysis using the depersonalization process (Voci, 2006) shows that the participants' definition of their social identity is divided into two contrasting self-perceptions. On the one hand, their self-categorisation regarding national identity is based on their feeling of being different due to ethnic distinctiveness, which also becomes a source of self-worth and pride in group membership. On the other hand, another aspect of their social identity depends on the treatment by out-group members as a refugee to them. Thus, the denied rights and experiences of relative deprivation are a daily reminder of their refugee identity. So, continuing with the depersonalisation effect, participants' sustainability of group cohesion and social cooperation (Hogg & Turner, 1985) depends on their inclination to the motherland felt through national identity and marginalised experiences in an exiled land due to their refugee identity.

Moving to the political direction, the study gained a better insight into the participants' nationalist orientation by analysing their reasoning behind their everyday social behaviours, life decisions and participation in the political sphere rather than reviewing their government's strategies to mobilise its masses. Most participants believe that they will free Tibet by living a mobilised way of life determined towards choosing life opportunities in the best interest of their struggle movement (such as resisting Indian citizenship), preserving cultural and religious values (like observing 'White Wednesday'), passing traditional knowledge through education to

instigate the feeling of nationalism among young generations (for instance, sending their children to TVC), and participating in peaceful political protests in response to atrocities in Tibet by Chinese authorities. However, a significant part of such empowered cognitive orientation originates from perceiving their Tibetan brothers/sisters living under Chinese occupation as more helpless than their own situation in India. For instance, many participants believed that continuing their mobilised way of life is essential to preventing self-immolation in Tibet. We further noticed that the inclination to the mentioned strategies depends on the age factor, such as elderly and middle-aged women participants placing more importance on shaping the younger generation's mindset for serving the Tibetan cause by continuing cultural and religious training. In contrast, the young stressed the seminality of political representation of Tibet on an international platform to challenge China. Similarly, to justify the potentiality of everyday politics in the long run, many participants identified their struggle for freedom with that of India's struggle against the British Empire, which took more than 200 years to achieve its goal.

At first glance, patience in their expectations and peaceful attitude towards freedom struggle appear to be independent choices deeply rooted in their self-conscious moralities. However, considering the literature review and recorded narratives, our analysis finds that these practices also highlight a strategic compromise between self-awareness about their limitations when compared to the enemy's strength and utilising the resources made available by their government to struggle for group empowerment. Thus, practised mobilisation strategies (see Chapter 6 analysis) do not allow compromising with their true identity, whose preservation further holds its political importance. In our opinion, these diffused efforts serve two additional purposes; first, the Tibetan model in India acts as a prototype for those under the PRC to continue to feel the difference between how their nation should be and how it is now, as many participants shared

that most significant factor for fleeing Tibet to India remains exercising cultural and religious freedom. It also helps maintain discontent among Tibetans regarding China's governance. Second, it may infuse a feeling among the participants that the Dalai Lama's presence is essential for Tibet's survival. In that sense, the participants' obligation to the provided normative fit represents a choice evaluated as the best option to contribute towards the sustenance of a version of Tibet in India, which should be more Tibet than Tibet itself as it will heighten the probability of Tibet's independence in a situation of resource crisis.

Existing literature has asserted that to attain the status of the national community, a nation should possess three fundamental criteria: national identity, national autonomy, and national unity (Smith & Smith, 2003). However, the Tibetans in exile have functions mainly on national identity and national unity with a significant element missing, i.e., national autonomy, which they have been fighting for decades. The decades-long Tibetan protest for the autonomy of their homeland opened a different way of looking at a nation. Even though China has annexed Tibet on the grounds of liberating it from the feudal forces and renamed Tibet - Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), however, the refugees' account of fleeing from Tibet through the dangerous routes of the Himalayan range and the cases of self-immolation (Woesor, 2016) suggests otherwise. It suggests that in the case of Tibet, national autonomy is missing both in Tibet and in exile. Challenging Smith's concept of nation, the Tibetan exiled community has shown that the national community can continue to exist as a cognitive artefact if there is a strong sense of national identity and national unity mediated through a sustainable mobilised way of life among its identifiers. The mentioned phenomena will continue depicting national commitment in various ways, through preserving the religious and cultural values as well as through every little and big effort Tibetans make to maintain the essentiality of their virtual nation. Earlier research

has also studied the Tibetans' struggle for a nation, but mainly from a social and political perspective, ignoring the role of the individual in the entire process. For instance, Amalendu Misra (2003) has examined the dynamics of long-distance nationalism and argued that diasporic nationalism does not grow in isolation but strengthens in collaboration with the political forces within Tibet. However, the revised policies of China for Tibet following the cases of self-immolation in 2008 have adversely impacted the strategy of long-distance nationalism, and the contemporary situation of Tibet nationalism in exile faces a cooperative crisis with Tibet.

Still, neither the struggle for Tibet's cause nor the sentiments for nationalism are found to be weak or decreasing among the interviewed refugee population of this study. Such a finding corresponds to the psychological construction of the nation, which is that if the foundation of national identity is built on its ethnic values, then the resilience of national identity can remain strong even in conditions of displacement or prolonged exile (Misra, 2003). It also highlights the psychological construction of the nation that extends beyond territorial boundaries, relying instead on a deep-seated connection to ethnic values and a collective memory of their homeland. This demonstrates how cultural and spiritual frameworks serve as pillars for maintaining national identity among displaced populations.

The findings of the present study share similarities with those works that highlighted the constructive elements of Tibetan refugee identity, which has changed over time, and now shows little resemblance with the attributes of Tibetan identity before the invasion of China in the 1950s. For instance, Dibyesh Anand defined that exiled Tibetan refugee identity, rather than said to be an ascribed one, is socially and politically constructed (Anand, 2000). In our findings too, the participants claim this throughout their interviews. Most of the time, national identity is taken for granted. This is not the case for Tibetan refugees. Before the Chinese invasion, Tibetan

identity was assumed to have a different status (Kolas, 1996), where religion and politics were entangled and national identity was taken for granted. After the exile lives began, there was a complete transformation in the social and political structure of the exiled Tibetan community and how Tibetan identities are being defined and re-defined. It surpassed the heterogenetic aspects of Tibetan identity before the Chinese invasion. It grouped all four religious sects (*Nyingma, Kagyu, Sakya,* and *Gelug*) into one group, which explicitly conveys Tibetan means as the followers of Buddhism to the out-group members. Further, it started incorporating the modern international values of gender equality and the democratisation of the power system (Asfuroglu, 2012). While agreeing with such a perspective, the findings of this work demonstrated the psychological significance of such changes at the individual level by entertaining the concepts of social identity theory.

For instance, the participants derive pride in comparing the gender roles of Tibetan society with those of the host nation. As one of the participants expressed, the status of women in Tibetan society is equal to that of men as they walk shoulder to shoulder with men in aspects of social performing roles. Such comparison gives them a point of negotiation for whether the Tibetan deserves to live in their own land as they are not only different from India in their cultural values but also they are not what China claims about Tibet's feudal past. Further, the psychological level attaching such categories to their ethnic values provides a valid reason for them to keep categorising themselves in terms of Tibetan national identity and finding instrumental values in their belonging to an ethnically pure nation. Such positive self-categorisation based on comparison with out-group members promotes psychological resilience among Tibetan refugees by nurturing a sense of moral superiority, self-worth, and group solidarity, which counteracts feelings of marginalisation and loss. Further, our findings suggest that it makes them perceive the

intention of assimilation with the immediate surroundings as a symbolic threat to their ethnic purity and thus enhances collective commitment to maintaining ethnic distinctiveness. Thus, a distinctive ethnic identity motivates the in-group members (Tibetans) to resist any kind of assimilation with the host culture and surroundings and preserve their unique identity. The same identification makes them come together as a group to protest against their common enemy, the Chinese and the reason for being united. This ethnicity-based national identity among Tibetans motivates them to organise their social movements in the face of a resource crisis. The in-group members consider themselves as a family. The use of family metaphors stresses this fact, and the bond they share with each other is also essential. Along with strong social relations, individuality and economic stability are maintained.

Another prominent factor found in the voices of the studied population is the absence of proximity factors among in-group members. Looking at the refugee status worldwide, one can observe that being together with family or their respective groups is difficult at times when it is a political displacement, the hardship increases. In the case of Tibetans, the displacement caused the refugees to disperse into various settlements with serious differences in cultural backgrounds. For instance, the local environment of the Bylakuppe settlement in South India is entirely different from that of North Indian settlements in terms of culture, language, and customs. Similarly, there are Tibetans who live in Western countries and experience entirely different cultural setups. Nevertheless, the participants keep the sense of belongingness intact in such a dispersed situation, and such solidarity emerges from their national identity, finding distance is no barrier to their bonding as Tibetans. The interview extracts depict how this togetherness is guided by their national identity in the absence of proximity factors. Wherever the Tibetans may be, they feel strongly tied to one identity - Tibetans, which is when they can imagine that they

are part of a broad community that shares the same culture, values, language, and traditions. The physical expression of this imagination takes the form of observing their rituals, speaking their language, maintaining their faith, and protesting for their nation. This sense of togetherness becomes particularly evident during events of political or social significance, where calls to unite Tibet resonate powerfully.

Even though Tibetans are dispersed throughout the world, when significant events occur with fellow Tibetans, all the others actively participate and protest. This mobilisation happens because of the national identity they carry in their mind. For example, many respondents expressed that wherever they go, they will always be Tibetan in their blood. Moreover, whatever happens with Tibetans, it is their responsibility to be with them. This account shows the extent of Tibetans' collective self-realisation as a group. This collective self-realisation happens based on the nation. When people identify collectively, the group's common goal is achieved through their collective effort. One respondent mentioned that if any self-immolation happens in the name of their nation, we respect that and gather together and do protests and demonstrations. However, if it is for individual causes, it is not good. Here, the deeds people do in the name of the nation are justified, and when it is for the individual's sake, it is not approved. When an in-group member commits self-immolation for group interests, it is valued primarily for a nation.

The social identity approach suggests that identification with a group involves categorisation and comparison. It also says that the mere categorisation of 'us versus them' enhances the group's similarities, increasing the cohesion between the group members (Hornsey, 2008). The constructed strong affinity of Tibetans emerged out of self-categorization as Tibetans, and comparisons are made with all the out-groups. Here, China acts as an enemy out-group, and Indians and others are considered as a friendly out-group. Nevertheless, challenging the

assumption that people always hate their enemies, the participants express that even though they identify China as the sole cause of their sufferings and plights, they still don't hate the country and neither hold a grudge against the Chinese people. They clarify that their feeling for their enemy must be understood as anger towards the unjustifiable policies of the communist government, which is the root cause of Tibet's plight. Further, the participants believe that the Chinese are innocent and dissatisfied with the communist governance but are helpless like them as they also fear persecution.

Thus, the present study outlines that in the case of exiled Tibetans, the categorisation of the Chinese as an enemy out-group and Indians, along with other host communities, as friendly out-groups is instrumental in sustaining Tibetan national identity and remaining politically active. The finding mentioned here aligns with the social identity approach in one way which emphasises how intergroup comparisons enhance group distinctiveness and strengthen in-group pride. Participants' narratives consistently reflected negative comparisons with the communist Chinese government, emphasising cultural and moral contrasts, such as the portrayal of Tibetans as peaceful and spiritual in opposition to the perceived aggression and materialism of the Chinese regime. These comparisons serve as a psychological mechanism to reinforce Tibetan identity, mobilise protest, and preserve their cultural values. However, the study also highlights the importance of positive comparisons with friendly out-groups like Indians, which adds a new dimension to understanding Tibetan identity that has been underexplored in the existing literature.

Negative comparisons with the Chinese regime are well-documented in studies of Tibetan resistance and identity formation. For instance, McGranahan (2010) discusses how narratives of victimhood and oppression under Chinese occupation are central to the collective memory of the

Tibetan diaspora, shaping their political activism and cultural resilience. Similarly, Bar-Tal (2000) suggests that narratives of collective victimhood are pivotal for sustaining group solidarity and mobilisation motives. The present study supports such findings by highlighting how Tibetan refugees draw on the plights of the past, including the destruction of monasteries and cultural repression, to construct a homogenous group identity rooted in moral superiority. However, the findings also extend this perspective by considering the role of supportive out-groups, which existing research often overlooks. For example, while McConnell (2011) focuses on Tibetan nationalism as an inward-looking phenomenon driven by cultural preservation, this study demonstrates that external relationships with host communities also play a crucial role in shaping Tibetan identity.

The positive comparisons with friendly out-groups, such as Indians, highlight the dual strategy of identity construction among Tibetan refugees. Unlike the antagonistic intergroup dynamics emphasised in much of the existing literature (e.g., Bar-Tal, 2000; McGranahan, 2010), this study highlights how supportive host environments facilitate psychological resilience and provide a semi-settled space from where they can re-construct both the psychological scars and governance system to plan future. Participants frequently acknowledged the freedoms and opportunities provided by India, contrasting them with the repression experienced under Chinese rule. Such comparisons promote a relational identity with host communities, characterised by gratitude and solidarity, which, in turn, helps reinforce ethnic identity in exile by linking their gratitude nature to their cultural and religious values reflecting their national traits. This aligns with studies on diaspora identity, such as those by Shneiderman (2015), who highlights how interactions with host communities influence the diasporic construction of selfhood, but this study takes it further by explicitly linking these dynamics to the dual strategy of intergroup comparison. Unlike

previous studies focusing predominantly on resistance and victimhood narratives, this study reveals the interplay between adversarial and cooperative intergroup comparisons as a dynamic process that sustains Tibetan identity and mobilisation strategies.

As individuals, Tibetans in exile are safe and happy compared to the other Tibetans in Tibet, says one respondent. However, as a group member or as a Tibetan national, the respondent is unhappy about the current situation of Tibetans. Interpreting from Reicher's (2001) perspective of group dynamics, among all the identities they possess, the group identity as a Tibetan is sometimes more important than individual survival. Here, the categorisation of 'us' versus 'them' within the Tibetan community is mentioned, and a comparison is made between Tibetans living in exile and Tibetans in Tibet. The current study is an example of the categorisation of in-group versus out-group members. As has already been discussed, most participants mentioned the distinctive feature that separates the in-group from the out-group, and it included the in-group's identity, culture, religion, and tradition. However, such categorisation is potent in relating to the pain of Tibetans who continue to suffer under communist rule; thus, when there are problems in Tibet, the rest of the Tibetans in exile express their solidarity towards their fellow Tibetans through protests and demonstrations. This mobilisation process depends upon the category inclusions and exclusions, i.e. who is included as a fellow national and who is not. The people who are mobilising and those who get mobilised use these category definitions to understand who belongs and who does not. For instance, other than two, all participants were born in exile, and only three have visited Tibet once in their lives. However, their spirit regarding their motherland motivates them to preserve their culture and lifestyle and keep them mobilised. For example, the narratives of the interviewed participants assert that Tibetans always prefer to contribute to their country in whatever manner possible. Moreover, they happily characterise their imagined nation,

participate in protests, and make use of every chance they get to represent their nation. Here, nationhood is used as a mobilisation tool, and the nation is considered sacred. Regarding the content of this mobilisation, national categories are used to awaken the national identity among Tibetans. By saying that national categories are used for the mobilisation process, we mean that who is included as national, what are the interests of the group, who represents the nation, how do group members consider themselves to be members of the group, and what are the norms and values of the group (Reicher & Hopkins, 2000).

Inferring the above-mentioned observations, it becomes evident that feeling the pain of in-group members, even those who you have never met or lived in inaccessible places, is a prominent factor for participating in social movements, especially for displaced communities like Tibetan exiles. The shared emotional connection by the participants, rooted in a strong group identity, enables them to internalise the struggles of their fellow Tibetans in Tibet as their own. According to Reicher, Spears and Haslam (2010), group identity helps construct a collective self-definition, where members align their emotions and actions with the group's overarching narrative, transforming the sense of belongingness into political projects. Tibetan exiles, while safe and relatively content in host nations, often express deep emotional anguish over the repression and suffering faced by Tibetans in Tibet. This emotional solidarity transcends geographical boundaries and strengthens their resolve to preserve their cultural and religious attributes and continue their struggle for Tibetan autonomy.

The role of emotional identification in sustaining movements is well-documented in social psychology. Drury and Reicher (2000) emphasise that collective identification in groups enables individuals to perceive others' suffering as personally significant, motivating altruistic and coordinated actions for the collective cause. Similarly, Jasper and Goodwin (2006) argue that

emotional resonance within a group is a key driver of sustained participation in social movements, as shared grievances and solidarity nurture a sense of purpose and moral obligation. This study extends such findings by highlighting the unique context of the Tibetan diaspora, where feeling the pain of in-group members acts as both a psychological anchor and a mobilising force. Unlike movements rooted solely in geographic proximity, the Tibetan cause exemplifies how transnational solidarity and emotional identification can keep a social movement alive across generations and borders.

In discussing the identity factor and mobilisation processes, it is crucial to understand that the thesis partially deals with the institution's mobilisation strategies for a nation to regulate its group members' identification and thought processes - including historical claims (Sperling, 2004), political discourse (Asfuroglu, 2012; Brox, 2012), and educational setups (Liu, 2015; Wangdu, 2020; Wangdu, 2021; Mishra, 2022). The significant intention of the present work is to understand the cognitive and affective factors that make Tibetan refugees identify with the version of Tibetan-ness presented to them and how this identification continues to shape their everyday behavioural aspects in an exiled land. In this sense, the analysis supports the parts of the theoretical assumptions of resource mobilisation theory (Klandermans, 1984), explicitly dealing with rationality in participation choices and expectations from the instrumentality of collective effort to overcome relative deprivation. However, the narratives of self-categorisation in terms of a nation's characteristics and relating to the sufferings of group members living in Tibet advance our study in the direction of research dealing with the role of identity and emotional resources for mobilisations (Reicher & Jogdand, 2016), the role of ethnic identification in predicting the collective action (van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008; Thomas, Zubielevitch, Sibley & Osborne, 2020), and similarly, excerpts of perceived

homogeneity and solidarity finds its similarity with Tuner's understanding of social movement (Turner, 1991). Further, Anouk Smeekes' (2015) perspective on 'national nostalgia' gives a theoretical perspective to our specific accounts where participants imagined the past of Tibet as aesthetic, consequently blaming China for its destruction and further discouraging intergroup relations while living in India. The findings also contribute to existing literature by emphasising the moral obligation tied to Tibetan identity. For instance, Shneiderman (2015) explores how cultural rituals and shared narratives reinforce group solidarity and trans-local belonging among Himalayan communities. Building on this, the present study demonstrates that for Tibetans in exile, the emotional connection to in-group members under oppression serves not only as a source of resilience but also as a moral imperative to act. While previous studies, such as Wilkes, Corrigall-Brown and Myers (2010), focus on collective action within politically marginalised groups, this study provides new insights into how identity and empathy intersect to sustain long-term social and political activism in a diasporic context.

However, our arguments depart from these assumptions in one critical way. We do not entirely locate our analysis in protest participation, an occasional phenomenon. More precisely, we treated such collective actions as a part of a larger struggle strategy and concentrated more on the cognitive and behavioural frames through which our participants perceive their status, negotiate between national and refugee identity, organise their way of life, and make mobilisation an everyday phenomenon. We even called it 'everyday mobilisation' for two reasons. First, it is being practised on exiled land, and second, the participants lack citizenship status. Nevertheless, we still see such processes as potential tools for understanding the concept of everyday citizenship (Hopkins & Blackwood, 2011) and nationalism in settled times (Bonikowski, 2016). Given that the continuity of a social struggle seminally depends as much on the practised

mobilisation in everyday life choices as it shoulders on organising and participating in a protest movement. The study invites scope for exploring how the phenomena of everyday bordering and belonging discourses in politics allow a citizen to imagine, uphold, and interact with the idea of a nation while protesting against its government policies.

Beyond the conventional way, the findings of the present research can be explained in the following bulletin points:

- The interactive aspects of the participants' imaginative features of their yet-to-visit nation retain the geographical richness and ethnic distinctiveness.
- The strong identification with the distinctiveness of their ethnic norms (such as religious and cultural values) and unwavering faith in the Dalai Lama is detrimental to developing a definitive Tibetan identity among our participants.
- When both factors - ethnic distinctiveness and faith in the Dalai Lama - are combined and developed into a reinforced identity available for Tibetans (the studied population in the present case) to embody, the identifiers then also embody the hidden norms associated with it that eventually transform into a true Tibetan trait or a national trait.
- The participants' understanding of their common enemy (that is, China) is profoundly driven by the national identity-ridden value window, which assumes that annexing China is an unjustifiable act that the world's most peace-oriented race never deserved.
- The participants are experiencing a divided self-concept as, in one direction, their national identity is a source of strength and pride. However, the realities of refugee life and lack of recognition from out-group members instigate a feeling of refugeehood among them.

- Nevertheless, both feelings merge to motivate them to struggle for the Tibetan cause as the national identity helps them visualise the growth opportunities a free Tibet can offer them. Contrary to that, they want to go back to Tibet to escape the harsh realities of refugee life.
- All the factors clubbed together result in a mobilised way of life that participants have adopted in India. Such a mobilisation process has become an integral part of their everyday life affairs. The participants shared that the rationale behind their life decisions, whether taking or refusing Indian citizenship, is to strengthen their social movement.
- Such phenomena challenge the traditional social psychological research on mobilisation, which treats it as an occasion phenomenon and tends to focus almost explicitly on organised campaigns. Here, the proposed concept of 'everyday mobilisation' suggests that the way of life of the interviewed Tibetan population holds a transformative potential for daily life practices in the pursuit of political legitimacy and cultural survival.

Conclusion

There has always been a prescribed version of how a nation should be, and when we consider the data from our research, we get an alternative version to add to this genre. The data set displays how a nation is formed without living on territory, not within boundaries but with the psyche, practising rituals, a hope of the return to the motherland, standing united in the odds and articulating national identity through various peaceful tactics. Most respondents incorporated history, their ancestors, language, culture, and religion to relate to their nation. The national identity is passed and preserved through generations, and efforts are continued. Since the time of

initial displacement, the fruitless efforts for independence have not blocked the vision of Tibetan mobilisation for the nation. The religious and political leader who represents Tibet, the His Holiness Fourteenth Dalai Lama, has played a significant role in keeping the national spirit alive and reorganising Tibetans in exile. Dalai Lama stands as a category prototype of the Tibetan community where people worldwide recognise this community based on their leader and their religion. Further, the study concludes that the Tibetan social movement is part of a larger struggle strategy which is found to be deeply embedded in the cognitive and behavioural frames through which our participants perceive their status, negotiate between national and refugee identity, organise their way of life, and make mobilisation an everyday phenomenon.

Limitations of the Study

The study focuses mainly on Tibetan communities in specific host countries, such as India, and might overlook how Tibetan identity is shaped in other parts of the world. Another limitation is that the thesis does not deeply explore the challenges or complexities in the relationships between Tibetan refugees and host communities, focusing mainly on positive interactions. With similar limits, the study missed the opportunity to explore the role of local communities - the actions of non-community members - in either supporting or contrasting the everyday enactment of Tibetan identity. Such an approach would have enabled the researcher to explore more explicitly the functions of the members of host nations in influencing the fundamental aspects of Tibetan lives in exile and its direct or indirect impact on their mobilisation strategies. Another limitation of the study is the lack of use of additional pieces of information, such as the Dalai Lama's speech on the occasion of the 2023 Uprising Day or the way symbolism was used in the infrastructure of the Bylakuppae settlement to substantiate or highlight the contradictions in the arguments narrated by the participants. Over-emphasis on the interview refrained the researcher

from capturing the voices that did not completely comply with the beliefs of the majority of Tibetans who prefer a diplomatic way for negotiation with China, such as favouring the Middle Way Approach over complete independence. Thus, the study would have benefited from recording the views of members of Tibetan political organisations, such as the Tibetan Youth Congress, that share disagreement with the present nature of the political negotiation strategy adopted by the Tibetan government-in-exile. It also primarily examines national and ethnic identity, with less attention to how factors like gender, class, or generational differences shape the experiences of Tibetan refugees. Also, the study focuses on the present dynamics of Tibetan identity and mobilisation without fully exploring how these have evolved over time. Finally, while the thesis compares its findings with existing studies, it could benefit from a broader comparative analysis with other displaced groups to place the Tibetan experience in a wider context.